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Abstract 
The structure of the labour market in industrialized economies has changed during the last 
decades. There has been an increase in atypical employment, such as limited contracts. This 
development has resulted in a dualization of the labour market between permanent workers, 
insiders, and temporary workers, outsiders. Some argue that this has implications for political 
behaviour and that the insider-outsider divide constitute new groups for political mobilization. 
Alongside with the changes on the labour market have new types of parties’ emerged, anti-
immigrant parties. New evidence suggest that labour market policies and institution can 
mitigate the success of anti-immigrant parties, because it compensates for the cost and risk of 
unemployment. This thesis aim to investigate the relationship between the insider-outsider 
divide, voting for anti-immigrant parties and the role of labour market policies and institutions. 
By conducting several multilevel logistic regressions, this thesis show that there is no 
significant association between type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties. There 
are some evidence of an association between labour market policies and institutions and voting 
for anti-immigrant parties. Contrary to what expected theoretically, the higher spending on 
active labour market policies in a country, the higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant 
parties. No interaction effect is found: being an outsider or insider does not affect voting for 
anti-immigrant parties differently depending on the design of labour market policies in a 
country. 
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Introduction 
Labour markets in advanced European countries have experienced large changes the last 
decades due to globalization and de-industrialization (Marx 2014). Labour markets are today 
characterized by uncertainty and job insecurity (Chung & Mau 2014; Berglund & Wallinder 
2015). Part time jobs, temporary contracts and agency work are increasingly common in 
industrialized economies (Burgoon & Dekker 2010). There has been a trend towards a 
dualization of the labour market and a rise in non-standard employment, that is, other contract 
types than permanent full-time jobs (Marx & Picot 2014). This new group is called outsiders 
and include people that for instance are temporary employed, and diverge from insiders, 
permanent workers, in terms of job security. There is an ongoing debate about the political 
implications of this labour market transformation. Rueda (2005) argues that outsiders are not 
represented by Social Democratic parties, and that economic insecurity due to an insecure 
labour market position may lead to political radicalization or alienation, such as voting for anti-
immigrant parties. While some have found empirical evidence that the insider-outsider divide1 
have implications for political preferences (Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Marx & Picot 2013), other 
scholars dispute that type of employment contract should have an impact on political 
preferences (Emmenegger 2009; Häuserman & Schwander 2012). 
Alongside with the structural changes and transformation of the labour market, anti-
immigrant parties have emerged in several party systems in Europe. The same process that have 
changed the labour market, globalization and denationalization, has also led to the formation of 
a new structural conflict in Europe (Kriesi et al. 2006). A recent study by Halikiopoulou and 
Vlandas (2015) show that labour market institutions affect voting patterns for anti-immigrant 
parties2. Labour market institutions affect people’s risk assessments, which in turn affects voter 
support for anti-immigrant parties. Labour market regulations and generous unemployment 
benefits can thus mitigate the effect of unemployment on anti-immigrant party success and 
diminish the support that otherwise should have risen.  
This thesis will further investigate what causes demand for anti-immigrant parties and the 
role of labour market policies and institutions. This thesis aim to answer whether insiders and 
outsiders diverge in their preference for anti-immigrant parties, and how labour market policies 
                                                     
1 The term insider-outsider and employment contract is in this thesis used interchangeable. 
2 Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) study is done on European Parliament election data, which is a special context 
since it is a second order election. This study takes the mechanism to the national context. The mechanism, that 
labour market policies should matter for anti-immigrant party success, is relevant on the national level because it 
traces back to fundamental characteristics of the welfare state. 
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affect these preferences. The proposed mechanism is that labour market policies and institutions 
can moderate the feeling of insecurity as a consequence of an insecure employment contract. 
Labour market policies and institutions affect how individuals perceive their economic security 
and the cost and risk of unemployment.  More specifically, this thesis investigate if people with 
insecure employment contracts are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties in countries 
with more generous labour market policies and institutions. Previous studies have almost 
exclusively focused on either the individual level or the contextual level when explaining anti-
immigrant party success and researchers calls for more studies that model micro and macro 
levels jointly (see e.g. Lubbers et al. 2002; Arzheimer 2009). This study contributes to filling 
this void by doing such joint modelling.  
Previous studies have shown that labour market policies and institutions matter for anti-
immigrant party success because they affect individuals’ assessment of cost and risks3. At the 
same time, there is evidence that the increased dualization of labour markets affect citizens’ 
political behaviour and party preference (Rueda 2005; Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Vulkan 2015). 
This thesis argues that anti-immigrant sentiments should be seen as a consequence of both 
individual level characteristics as well as labour market context, more specifically how labour 
market policies and institutions are designed. This thesis contributes to the research field of 
anti-immigrant parties, the labour market literature and institutional theory by combining the 
three strands of literature. 
After presenting the aim and the research questions, this thesis continues with a definition 
of anti-immigrant parties and what in previous research have been identified as reasons for their 
electoral success. Thereafter, theory and previous research connected to the topic of the thesis 
are discussed. Then, methods and data are presented which is followed by a presentation of the 
results. Finally, the findings and the results are summarized and discussed.  
 
Aim and research questions  
There is ambiguity in the literature whether the insider- outsider divide have implications for 
political behaviour and political preferences. Therefore, this thesis will first investigate if 
insiders and outsiders diverge in their probability of voting for anti-immigrant parties. Second, 
according to institutional theory generally and Halikiopoulou and Vlandas’ (2015) study at the 
                                                     
3 Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) show that labour market institutions condition the support for anti-immigrant 
parties on the aggregated level. However, it is important to note that the trend on the aggregated level does not 
have to be valid at the individual level.  
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macro level more specifically, institutions affect political preferences and can condition the 
support for anti-immigrant parties. Consequently, this thesis will examine whether labour 
market policies and institutions reduce the support for anti-immigrant parties by modelling 
micro and macro level factors jointly. The suggested mechanism is that labour market policies 
impair feelings of insecurity. Individuals who feel less insecure on the labour market are less 
likely to support anti-immigrant parties.  
 
The research questions of this thesis are: 
1. How does employment contract affect voting for anti-immigrant parties? 
2. How do labour market policies and institutions affect voting for anti-immigrant parties? 
3. Does employment contract affect voting for anti-immigrant parties differently 
depending on the design of labour market policies and institutions in a country? 
 
The focus on demand side explanations, but does not deny supply side factors. Labour 
market policies and institutions are not claimed to be the main explanation to the emergence of 
anti-immigrant parties. Rather, given that there exist a supply of anti-immigrant parties in a 
country, which voters are more likely to support anti-immigrant parties? Here, employment 
contract is theorized to affect voting for anti-immigrant parties, but it is also important to 
understand the conditioning role of labour market policies and institutions. 
 
Definition and explanations to the success of anti-immigrant parties 
Definition of anti-immigrant parties 
There is no consensus in the literature on a definition of parties belonging to the anti-immigrant 
party family. There are several labels in the literature such as ‘radical populist right’ (Mudde 
2007), ‘far right’ (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2015) ‘radical right’ (Rydgren 2007) or ‘extreme 
right’ (Ignazi 2003). The lowest common denominator of parties that are given these different 
labels is what Mudde (2007) calls ‘nativism’. Nativism is an ideology that combines 
xenophobia and nationalism and the concept incorporates racism, ethnocentrism and anti-
immigrant sentiments. The nation state should be as homogenous as possible, and non-native 
elements such as persons, ideas and polices, are seen as a threat to the nation state. In this thesis, 
the parties are labelled anti-immigrant parties (van der Brug et al. 2005; Dahlström & Sundell 
2012; Erlingsson et al. 2012; Loxbo 2014). There are two reasons why this more policy-oriented 
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definition purposed by van der Brug et al. (2005) will be used. First, as several scholars point 
out, the anti-immigration issue is the core message of all parties belonging to this party family 
(Rydgren 2007; 2008). One of few common denominators of the parties is that they have a 
harsh stance on immigration (Arzheimer 2009). Therefore, parties that are mentioned under the 
different labels above and have the immigration issue as their main political concern will be 
included in the study. Second, anti-immigrant parties cannot easily fit in to the left-right 
dimension and it is not self-evident that parties in this group should be placed on the right end 
of the left-right dimension (Dahlström & Sundell 2012). The Nordic countries serve as a good 
example of this. Jungar & Jupskås (2014) has shown that the largest anti-immigrant parties take 
a centrist position on the left-right dimension. Therefore, using a terminology that places these 
parties on the right side is not satisfactory.  
Previous research on what explains the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties 
Research on what explains the success of anti-immigrant parties has become a minor industry 
since these parties started to gain electoral success during the last decades. Research usually 
groups together different types of explanations in demand and supply side factors when 
explaining the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties. Demand side explanations focus on 
different factors that have changed the attitudes, beliefs and preferences of the voters. Supply 
side explanations focus on the political programs that anti-immigrant parties offer, the role of 
party organizations, and a number of political opportunity structures such as the role of the 
electoral system and how mainstream parties or the media handle the new parties (Rydgren 
2007)4. This thesis connects to the demand side literature, which refers to theories capturing 
factors that increase the demand for anti- immigrant parties. Demand side explanations are 
governed by an overarching rationale that conditions in society determine the success of parties 
(Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2015). Broadly, demand side factors are divided into two groups; 
one that emphasise the importance of economic factors and one that stress cultural factors. 
Some argue that economic factors such as rising unemployment, economic crisis, low income, 
deprivation or expectations of deprivation create favourable conditions for anti-immigrant 
parties (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2007). The economic argument stresses the perceived competition 
over scarce economic resources. Here, the two most influential theories are the modernization 
                                                     
4The success of anti-immigrant parties has resulted in tremendous scientific interest. For thorough literature 
reviews on the topic see Kitschelt (2007) or Rydgren (2007).  
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loser’s theory and the relative deprivation theory. According to the modernization loser’s 
theory, societal changes such as globalization have led to new structural conflicts in Western 
Europe. Anti-immigrant parties have emerged as “a consequence of a profound transformation 
of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European democracies” 
(Betz 1994:26-27). Or more specifically, as a consequence of the transformation from an 
industrial to a post-industrial economy. As a result of increased individualization, this transition 
is characterized by differentiation, fragmentation and dissolution. These developments increase 
the importance of flexibility and individual entrepreneurship in order to adapt to the rapid 
changes in society. Hence, the people that possess these characteristics are supposed to be 
winners in post-industrial societies. Losers on the other hand, are people who are unable to cope 
with the economic, social and cultural modernization, which are struck in full or partial 
employment and run the risk of falling outside society (Betz 1994). Losers in this socio-
economic change are more probable to vote for anti-immigrant parties (Betz 1994; Swank & 
Betz 2003; Rydgren 2007). The structural conflict between winners and losers is expected to 
constitute a new base for political mobilization (Kriesi et al. 2006). Likewise, the relative 
deprivation theory focuses on the frustration and worries rising from feelings of relative 
deprivation as a consequence of worsening economic conditions. These feelings are caused by 
disappointing comparisons with one’s past, or other social groups, when one’s life trajectory 
suddenly deviates from what is expected (Rydgren 2007). Both these theories assume that 
certain groups are more prone to vote for anti-immigrant parties, because people, based on their 
current situation, are deprived or are expecting deprivation in their situation.  
However, more recent studies have been increasingly contended that cultural explanations, 
such as perceived cultural threat of immigration, matter more than economic explanations. 
Conflict over scarce resources does not only have to be economic: group interest can also clash 
over cultural identities and values. In general, people’s preference of anti-immigrant parties is 
explained by a perceived cultural threat as a result of increased immigration (Oesch 2008; 
Lucassen & Lubbers 2012). However, there seem to be a variation among social groups: for 
workers, economic attitudes such as fear of wage dumping and welfare competition are more 
important explanations for voting for anti-immigrant parties, compared to the middle class. 
Cultural grievances are also important for understanding the support for anti-immigrant parties 
among the class categories with the weakest labour market position (Oesch 2008). Thus, the 
support for anti-immigrant parties seems to be a combination of economic and cultural 
explanations. 
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At the context level, the correlation between unemployment rate and anti-immigrant party 
voting have showed inconclusive results. Some find an insignificant relationship (Lubbers et 
al. 2002, Swank & Betz 2003), others a negative relationship (Arzheimer & Carter 2006) or 
dependent on other factors such as level of immigration (Golder 2003). Jackman & Volpert 
(1996) show a positive and significant relationship between level of unemployment and voting 
for anti-immigrant parties.  
Although the scientific interest in anti-immigrant parties has increased in line with their 
growing success, most studies either employ small-N methods focusing on few cases, which 
complicate generalizability, or large-N studies focusing on individual level voting patterns 
(Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2015). There are few studies examining the impact of different 
economic factors at the macro level and researchers call for more studies that model micro and 
macro level explanations jointly (see e.g. Arzheimer 2009; Lubbers et al. 2002), and this thesis 
aims to contribute with such joint explanation. More specifically, this thesis investigates what 
role economic insecurity based on labour market position and labour market policies have on 
anti-immigrant party success, by modelling both macro and micro level factors, which rarely 
has been done before. 
 
Insider-outsider theory, economic insecurity and political behaviour 
It is debated whether class still matters when explaining voting behaviour (see e.g. Brooks et 
al. 2006) and some even argue that the insider-outsider divide is challenging or even replacing 
class as the main organizing principle (see e.g. Vulkan 2015). All advanced welfare states have 
experienced pressure from labour flexibility and lower labour costs due to growing international 
competition and growing service sectors. Since deregulation of employment protection is 
politically difficult, temporary employment has been created in order to increase flexibility on 
the labour market (Marx & Picot 2014; Marx 2014). This has resulted in an increase of 
temporary employment in many European countries since the 1980s (King & Rueda 2008).  
 That temporary employment is a common feature, thus to a varying degree, of European 
labour markets can be seen in figure 1. Figure 1 shows the proportion of temporary employees 
as percentage of the total number of employees in the countries included in this study. 
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Figure 1. Temporary employees, aged 15-64 years, as percentage of the total number of 
employees by country (%) 
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Note: The countries that are presented in this figure are those who are included in the analysis. The percentages 
for each country come from a year between 2008-2013.  
Source: Eurostat  
 
The insider-outsider theory is the most prominent approach in economics to explain 
differences in job security. In a nutshell, insider-outsider theory argues that labour markets are 
divided into two segments with conflicting interest. Insiders are those employed in full-time 
permanent jobs whereas outsiders are those who are unemployed, employed full-time in fixed-
term and temporary jobs, employed part time or studying (Rueda 2005). This means that an 
insider’s and an outsider’s position are defined by an individual’s objective position in the 
labour market. Additionally, the mobility between the two groups of insiders and outsiders is 
generally low (Marx & Picot 2014). 
Labour markets in Western Europe are today increasingly dualized with significant 
differences in job security between insiders and outsiders (Häusermann & Schwander 2012; 
Rueda 2014). In the labour market literature, insiders and outsiders are assumed to diverge in 
their policy preference, because outsiders face higher risks than insiders (Rueda 2005; 2007). 
Job insecurity is usually defined as an individual’s fear of job loss (De Witte 1999). Often a 
distinction is made between a subjective and objective side of job insecurity. Objective job 
insecurity refers to actual risk of job loss, by considering the precariousness that temporary jobs 
means compared to permanents jobs. The subjective side is more a matter of the individual’s 
own perception of their own situation. Two persons that in the objective sense have the same 
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contract type may interpret their situation in different ways. However, people who feel insecure 
on the labour market are more often people with a precarious position, indicating that job 
insecurity not only is of subjective nature. Blue-collar workers, low skilled employees, people 
with temporary contracts are to a greater extent perceiving themselves as insecure. Hence, job 
insecurity, despite its subjective character, is a good reflection of an individual’s real chances 
on the labour market (De Witte 2005). Other scholars distinguish between an affective and 
cognitive side of job insecurity (see e.g. Anderson & Pontusson 2007). The cognitive side refers 
to the individual’s own assessment of the likelihood of losing a job, which may include error 
judgement. A positive correlation has been found between the actual risk of job loss and the 
individual’s own evaluation of the risk of job loss. The affective side refers to the emotional 
reaction to the potential calculation of losing one’s job. The affective side refers to the 
individual’s limited means to handle the threat (Berglund et al. 2014). 
Job insecurity leads to greater economic insecurity, and there is prevalent evidence that 
economic insecurity affects people’s view on the political system and their voting behaviour 
(see e.g. Mughan & Lacy 2002; Rueda 2005; Marx 2014). However, the empirical evidence of 
an effect of the insider-outsider divide on party preference is disputed. Two single country 
studies have found evidence of this, which qualifies the relevance of the insider-outsider divide 
as important for party choice (see Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Marx & Picot 2013). On the 
contrary, a comparative study by Emmenegger (2009) finds that temporary workers do not 
diverge systematically from permanent workers in their political preference.  
The precariousness of the work situation based on type of contract, temporary or permanent, 
affects feelings of job security (Vulkan 2015). People in the labour market differ in their 
resources and how exposed they are to risks. Since the 1970s insiders are less exposed to 
unemployment and they also benefit from that outsiders act as buffer: outsiders are affected the 
hardest by economic fluctuations. Thus, insiders and outsiders are unequally exposed to risks: 
time-limited contracts means higher economic insecurity, which may affect political 
preferences. Temporary workers are particularly exposed to the risk of unemployment (Marx 
& Picot 2014). Hence, the insider-outsider divide have gained ground in relation to party 
preference and it is important to take it into consideration when understanding politics and 
policy development (Rueda 2005; Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Oskarson 2012; Vulkan 2015). 
Another reason why the insider-outsider divide might be relevant in understanding the rise 
of anti-immigrant parties is that the divide creates a strategic dilemma for Social Democratic 
parties. Social Democratic parties usually promote labour interest, but all labour is not equally 
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vulnerable to unemployment. Social Democratic parties have strong incentives to consider 
insiders their main constituency. This is because insiders are more politically active; they 
outnumber the outsiders and are therefore an electorally more relevant group for Social 
Democratic parties (Rueda 2005). This might force outsiders to opt for more radical policy 
alternatives because they feel ignored and overlooked by mainstream parties (Rueda 2005; 
Rueda 2007; Lindvall & Rueda 2012). Hence, according to insider-outsider theory, temporary 
workers are not only insecure, but also politically marginalized.  
To sum up, this thesis argues that the reason why the insider-outsider divide should translate 
into party support for anti-immigrant parties is twofold: (1) insiders and outsiders diverge in 
political preference due to differences in job security which is expected to fuel demand for anti-
immigrant parties5. People who feel relatively deprived are more likely to support anti-
immigrant parties (Betz 1994), (2) outsiders turn away from mainstream political parties 
because of political marginalization or alienation (Rueda 2005).  
The argument of this thesis is that economic situation following from one’s labour market 
position could explain why people vote for anti-immigrant parties. People who are 
disadvantaged or marginalised compared to other groups are more likely to exhibit anti-
immigrant attitudes (Demker 2014). People in a more vulnerable economic situation are 
expected to support anti-immigrant parties to a greater extent than people in safer economic 
situations because of perceived economic threats as a consequence of their job insecurity. But 
in order to understand under which circumstances people vote for anti-immigrant parties it is 
also important to understand the role of labour market policies and institutions. 
 
Institutions, labour market policies and voting for anti-immigrant parties 
That institution’s affect citizens’ political attitudes and behaviour is discussed in the extensive 
literature on institutional theory, and in the policy feedback literature (Kumlin & Stadelmann-
                                                     
5There are some studies done on job insecurity and voting for anti-immigrant parties using other indicators of job 
insecurity than the insider-outsider divide. In a study by Bornschier & Kriesi (2013), job insecurity is measured 
by a factor referring to whether respondents have been unemployed in the past few years and how likely 
unemployment is in the next twelve months. Measured in that way, job insecurity plays no role in determining the 
vote for anti-immigrant parties. There is also some evidence that subjective insecurity is related to welfare-
chauvinism attitudes; people who feel more threatened in their position are less willing to include immigrants into 
the welfare system (Mewes and Mau 2012).  
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Steffen 2014). Political institutions shape, constrain and affect the behaviour and preferences 
for both citizens and elites. Government constraints put on individuals are important sources of 
political behaviour (Pierson 1993). Consequently, policy feedback is the process in which 
enacted policies affect political preferences and action among citizens (Mettler & Soss 2004). 
Pierson (1993) identifies two ways in which feedback effects are likely to occur. First, 
institutions create both incentives and constraints for political participation, hence affecting 
what individuals see as possible or not. Second, in order for a policy to generate some sort of 
response from the public, the policy must be visible i.e. policy information must be spread 
among the public and traceable i.e. the public must be able to connect the policy outcome to 
actions taken by the government in order to respond to it. Put differently, if a policy feedback 
effect should occur, the citizenry must be able to directly or indirectly experience the products 
provided by the state through transfers or services (Solevid 2009).   
In the context of this study, the policy feedback effect is twofold. First, policies are part of 
forming the insider-outsider divide. Governments can obstruct or facilitate the trend towards 
more non-standard employment such as temporary work. The structure of the workforce is a 
consequence of government policies, or the lack thereof. If there is an increased segmentation 
between people in the workforce, these newly created social categories can constitute new 
voting groups. If these groups diverge in their political preferences, it is a consequence of 
economic circumstances relative to the other group. Second, policies also shape the economic 
prospects of the new social group. The generosity of employment compensation in a country 
matters for individuals’ perceptions of their economic insecurity. Policies shape the economic 
outlook of the two different groups. If these two groups, insider or outsider, differ 
systematically in their job security because of existing policies or a lack of government 
intervention it can be expected that these groups also differ in political preferences, which party 
they vote for, which could create a feedback effect into the political process (Marx & Picot 
2014).  
There are a few studies that empirically have tested the relationship between labour market 
policies and institutions or how welfare state arrangements affect voting patterns for anti-
immigrant parties. Although they are all using other indicators than this thesis, they study the 
relationship between institutions and the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties in different 
ways. Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) show that labour market policies and institutions play 
a role in explaining cross-country differences in the success of anti-immigrant parties. Labour 
market policies and institutions influence people’s cost and risk assessment: where 
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unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect on 
voting for anti-immigrant parties, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to 
higher support for these parties. Hence, they find that the design of labour market policies and 
institutions condition the impact of unemployment on anti-immigrant party support. Generous 
unemployment benefits can in itself reduce the support for these parties. The welfare state 
affects people's risk assessments that the voter support for parties that want to stop or reduce 
immigration is affected - regulation on the labour market and generous unemployment benefits 
will diminish the support that otherwise would have risen.  
Swank and Betz (2003) analyse how globalization affects the support for anti-immigrant 
parties. They find a compensating effect of welfare state institutions on anti-immigrant party 
success. In a macro level model, they find that countries with high level of social protection are 
less likely to exhibit successful anti-immigrant parties because generous welfare state policies 
compensate and mitigate economic insecurity. However, both Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 
(2015) and Swank and Betz (2003) analyse the impact of institutions on the macro level, 
ignoring the micro level. Arzheimer’s (2009) study, which aim is to explain cross country 
variation in anti-immigrant party success using multilevel modelling, shows that 
unemployment benefits play a role in support for anti-immigrant parties6. 
In sum, there is no consensus in the literature on how welfare state institutions and labour 
market regulations affect feelings of insecurity. While some argue that institutions, measured 
through levels of social expenditure as percentage of GDP and unemployment benefit 
replacement rate, explain varying levels of job security across countries (Anderson & 
Pontusson 2007) others conclude that institutions have minimal impact of feelings on security 
when other macro-economic and labour market contexts are taken into consideration (Chung 
& van Oorschot 2011). The different results seem to differ due to type of institutional 
arrangement. Chung and van Oorschot (2011) find that active labour market policies (ALMPs) 
and passive labour market policies (PLMPs) such as unemployment benefits, make people feel 
more secure rather than institutions that help individuals keep their current jobs, such as 
employment protection legislation (EPL).  
Thus, there are some evidence that suggest that labour market institutions or certain welfare 
state arrangements can depress the success of anti-immigrant parties and feelings of insecurity, 
                                                     
6 Arzheimer (2009) and Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) are using different indicators for measuring labour 
market policies.   
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and that institutions can have a ‘protective’ effect on the electoral success of anti-immigrant 
parties.  
 
Theoretical conclusion, proposed mechanism and hypotheses 
This thesis have so far discussed, theoretically, why employment contract should affect voting 
behaviour for anti-immigrant parties, and the role of labour market policies and institutions. By 
combining these different strands of literature, this section will lay out the conclusion of the 
theoretical discussion, the proposed mechanism and present the hypothesis of the thesis. 
Why insiders and outsiders should diverge in their political preference for anti-
immigrant parties and the role of labour market policies and institutions  
Labour markets have, due to structural changes and transformations as a consequence of 
globalization, de-nationalization and increased international competition, changed the last 
decades. This is especially visible in the emergence of growing service sectors, and an increase 
in atypical employment such as temporary contracts instead of permanent contracts. According 
to Rueda (2005) these changes have created two segments on the labour market, insiders and 
outsiders, whom diverge in job security. Insiders and outsiders are assumed to diverge in their 
political preferences, as a consequence of their employment contract. Having an insecure 
employment contract give rise to feelings of economic insecurity, or relative deprivation 
compared to the other social group, and is in this thesis theorized to cause demand for anti-
immigrant parties. Citizens that perceive themselves in an economically vulnerable or 
marginalized position may be more afraid of increased competition from immigrants7. One of 
several theoretical explanations in research on what cause demand for anti-immigrant parties is 
that people vote for these parties because they feel deprived, or are expecting deprivation and 
a worsening economic situation. Hence, outsiders are in more economic vulnerable positions, 
and are therefore expected to vote for anti-immigrant parties to a higher extent than insiders. 
Insiders and outsiders may also be unequally entitled for different unemployment insurances, 
which make outsiders more insecure than insiders. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Due to higher economic risk, the probability of voting for anti-
immigrant parties is higher among outsiders compared to insiders. 
                                                     
7 That increased immigration result in an actual competition over for example jobs has no support in research, 
people rather presuppose that increased immigration may result in increased competition (Demker 2014). 
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Recent studies have shown that labour market policies and institutions can have a 
‘protective’ effect on anti-immigrant party success. Of the labour market institutions that are 
set up to provide security for individuals, the main focus in previous research has been on 
ALMPs, PLMPs and EPL. ALMPs and PLMPs have been shown to decrease feelings of 
insecurity on the labour market (see e.g. Chung & van Oorschot 2011), and support for anti-
immigrant parties should therefore be lower in countries with more generous labour market 
policies.  
 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): More generous labour market policies lower the voter’s 
probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties.  
 
What role EPL plays for providing security for workers is ambiguous. EPL makes it harder 
for employers to dismiss workers, and some argue that EPL increase feelings of insecurity, 
whereas other argue that EPL do not have any significant impact of individual’s security 
perceptions (Chung & van Oorschot 2011). However, there are some evidence that strictness 
of EPL is related to voting support for anti-immigrant parties: Halikiopoulou & Vlandas (2015) 
show that unemployment fuels support for anti-immigrant parties less in countries with strict 
EPL for permanent workers.  
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The stricter EPL, the lower the probability to vote for anti-
immigrant parties. 
 
Turning back to the role of the insider-outsider divide, the effect of employment contract 
on anti-immigrant party support is assumed to be lower in countries with more comprehensive 
and generous labour market policies and more protective institutions. Labour market policies 
and institutions compensate for the feeling of insecurity as a consequence of an insecure 
employment contract (Arzheimer 2009). A more comprehensive policy, with more generous 
labour market policies, leads to people feeling less threatened compared to people in countries 
with less generous labour market polices. ALMPs and PLMPs have in previous research shown 
to matter for people’s feeling of security (see e.g. Chung & van Oorschot 2011) and there are, 
as discussed above, some evidence that the strictness of EPL play a role. This thesis argues that 
people in more protected countries (i.e. where spending on ALMPs and PLMPs is larger or EPL 
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is stricter) are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties and this despite a relatively insecure 
employment contract. In countries with more generous labour market policies, people believe 
that institutions will help if one ends up in a precarious position. The risk of unemployment and 
economic loss due to an insecure employment contract can thus be compensated for by labour 
market policies and institutions.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party is lower among 
outsiders in countries with more generous labour market policies and institutions, 
compared to outsiders in countries with less generous labour market policies and 
institutions. 
 
The hypotheses are visualized in figure 2. H1 represent the direct effect of the insider-
outsider divide on the probability of voting for an anti-immigrant party. H2a and H2b is the 
direct effect of labour market policies and institutions on voting for anti-immigrant parties. H2a 
and H2b test the impact of macro level factors such as labour market policies and institutions 
on the probability of voting for anti-immigrant parties. H3 represent the conditioned 
relationship of labour market policies: if labour market policies affect voting on anti-immigrant 
parties differently depending on type of contract. 
 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis argues for a causal chain that goes from employment contract, which affect feelings 
of security on the labour market, to increased likelihood of voting for anti-immigrant parties. 
Employment contract  
Voting for anti-immigrant party 
Labour market policies 
and institutions 
H3 
H1 
H2a+b 
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The opposite causal order, that voting for anti-immigrant party affect a person’s employment 
contract does not seem probable.  
In the following section will the data and methods, which are used to test the hypothesis 
empirically, be presented. 
 
Data, selection of cases and operationalizations  
Data 
The individual level data comes from European Social Survey (ESS). ESS is an academically 
driven cross-national survey that has been performed every two year since 2001. The aim of 
ESS is to investigate people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviour in European countries. A cross-
sectional sample of the population in each country is selected and interviewed face-to-face (ESS 
2016). ESS is suitable for the empirical analysis because it includes questions on both 
employment contract and voting behaviour. The empirical findings in this thesis are based 
mainly on ESS round 7 from 2014. Where data from the ESS survey from 2014 is missing, data 
from a previous year is used in order to get as large sample and cover as many countries as 
possible. In table 1 are the ESS years used for each country reported. In total 19 countries are 
included in this study. Some countries are excluded due to missing context data and some 
countries are excluded because they do not have a successful anti-immigrant party8. This thesis 
only includes countries where at least one anti-immigrant party has won political representation. 
To end up in the sample a requirement is that the country have an anti-immigrant party in any 
round of the ESS9. Table 1 show the proportion and the actual number of individuals in the 
sample who state that they have voted for an anti-immigrant party10. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8ESS includes in total 36 countries. 14 countries are omitted in the analysis because they do not have a successful 
anti-immigrant party. Three countries (Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria) are omitted due to missing data on either 
the indicators for labour market policies or employment protection legislation.  
9It could be argued that countries where the immigration issue has not been politicized, i.e. where no anti-
immigrant parties exist, also should be included in the analysis. Including negative cases should just expand the 
sample on one side. The aim of this thesis is, given that it exists a supply of anti-immigrant parties, see how labour 
market policies and institutions affect voting for these parties. 
10 See appendix 2 for full names and sources of coding for the anti-immigrant parties. 
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Table 1. Countries, parties and number of observations  
 
Country 
ESS 
year 
used 
Anti-
immigrant-
party (AIP) 
N observations 
(voters only) in 
sample  
N AIP 
voters in 
sample 
Proportion of 
AIP voters in 
sample (%) 
Score in corresponding 
election (%) 
 
 
     
Austria 2014 FPÖ, BZÖ 1094 166 15,2 FPÖ: 20.5, BZÖ: 3.53 
Belgium 2014 VB, FN 1360 78 5,7 VB: 3.7, FN: <1 
Switzerland 2014 SVP, LEGA 671 135 20,1 SVP: 27, LEGA: 1 
Czech Republic 2014 Usvit 1121 44 3,9 6,9 
Denmark 2014 DF 1179 143 12,1 13,9 
Estonia 2014 EKRE, EIP 1029 12 1,2 EKRE: 2,1, EIP: 0,4  
Finland 2014 PS 1345 187 13,9 19,1 
France 2014 FN 1060 126 11,9 13,6 
Great Britain 2014 UKIP 1401 104 7,4 12,7 
Greece 2010 GD, LAOS 1271 56 4,4 GD: 0,3, LAOS: 5,6 
Hungary 2014 Jobbik 855 159 18,6 16,7 
Italy 2012 LN 536 8 1,5 4,1 
Lithuania 2014 TT 1045 101 9,7 7,3 
Netherlands 2014 PVV 1353 109 8,1 10,1 
Norway 2014 FrP 1083 136 12,6 16,3 
Poland 2014 PiS 779 261 33,5 29,9 
Sweden 2014 SD 1437 71 4,9 12,9 
Slovenia 2012 SNP 644 10 1,6 1,8 
Slovakia 2010 SNP 1111 37 3,3 5,1 
 
  
A comparison between the anti-immigrant parties score in the election and score in ESS 
suggest that the ESS survey underestimates anti-immigrant parties’ success to a large extent. 
This is not something new: underestimation of the success of anti-immigrant parties is a 
constant feature of surveys. This is often explained by socially conformist behaviour. People 
do not want to admit that they voted for an anti-immigrant party, because these parties are 
stigmatized. This combined with that voters who support anti-immigrant parties participate less 
in surveys compared to other voters leads to underestimation. Previous studies often notice the 
problem of underestimation, and state that it is important to bear in mind rather than solving it 
in any specific way (see e.g. Oesch 2008). The problem of underestimation results in it being 
harder to get significant results. 
Data for the context variables is taken from either OECD statistics or Eurostat. Following 
Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015), data for all context variables, both for labour market 
indicators and the context control variables, are taken from the year before the election in each 
country take place. The rationale behind this is that voters evaluate the situation prior to the 
election.  
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Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, voting for anti-immigrant party, is measured using the question “what 
party did you vote for in the last election”. The variable is dichotomized and recoded so that 1 
means voting for an anti-immigrant party and 0, all other parties. Two problems of validity are 
related to the dependent variable. First, as Marx and Picot (2014) note, there might be a problem 
using the survey question on vote choice in last election since we do not know the respondent’s 
employment contract at the time of the election. This has implications for the validity of the 
measurement. Therefore, following Marx and Picot (2014) the party identification variable “is 
there a particular party that you feel closer to than all the other parties?- which one?” will also 
be used as dependent variable as robustness check. Second, another problem related to the 
dependent variable is that people forget what they voted for in the last election (Waldahl & 
Aardal 1982). Ultimately, the best measure would have been a question on current vote 
intention or party sympathy at the moment. The ESS survey does not include such a question 
and therefore the question of vote choice in last election is used. These two validity problems 
related to the dependent variable are important to bear in mind, because they may affect the 
results and conclusions that can be drawn. However, this thesis tries to account for these 
problems by using the party identification variable as dependent variable to check the 
robustness of the results.   
Focal independent variable  
The focal independent variable measuring the insider-outsider divide, employment contract, is 
operationalized using the question that asks the respondents if they have a work contract that is 
of unlimited or limited duration.  This variable is recoded so that 1 means limited, i.e. including 
respondents with limited contract, and 0 means all the respondents with unlimited contract. In 
this thesis it is expected that type of contract, if you are an insider or outsider, affect your 
probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Individuals with limited work contract are 
expected to be more insecure, because they have less job security, and are therefore theorized 
to be more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties.  
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People who are marginalized on the labour market, or perceive themselves as disadvantaged 
vis-à-vis other groups, are more likely to support anti-immigrant parties11. 
Intervening variables at contextual level  
The country-level institutional variables are level of spending on ALMPs, PLMPs, and the EPL 
index for permanent and temporary workers. This thesis expects that labour market policies and 
institutions both have an independent effect on voting for anti-immigrant parties and an 
interaction effect. When the indicators for labour market policies or institutions are interacted 
with type of contract, the labour market policies and institutions affect people with limited and 
unlimited contracts probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties differently. Outsiders in 
countries with more generous labour market policies and stricter EPL are less likely to support 
anti-immigrant parties compared to outsiders in countries with less generous labour market 
policies and less strict EPL. 
ALMPs and PLMPs is the percent of GDP that a country spends on these policies. The 
larger proportion, the larger percent of a country’s GDP is spent on ALMPs and PLMPs.  
ALMPs main aim is to help individuals back to work once becoming unemployed. ALMPs 
include spending on public employment services and administration, labour market training, 
programs for youths when in transition from school to work, programs to provide or promote 
employment for unemployed and programs for disabled. ALMPs are assumed to make workers 
more secure because they increase the skills of unemployed, by training programmes as well as 
by helping in job search activities (Chung & Mau 2014). 
 PLMPs are unemployment benefits, and provide economic security for those who have lost 
their jobs. Unemployment benefits provide security for workers because they mean that workers 
have income security if they become unemployed (Chung & Mau 2014; Anderson & Pontusson 
2007). 
The two EPL indices are developed by OECD and refer to rules concerning dismissal of 
employees; for individual layoffs, for collective layoffs and rules for temporary contracts 
(Berglund & Wallinder 2015). The EPL indices are ranging from 0 to 6, meaning the higher 
EPL index, the lower risk of losing a job. The higher the EPL index, the stricter the job 
                                                     
11According to insider-outsider theory, outsiders are people who are unemployed, employed temporary contracts, 
employed part time or studying (Rueda 2005). In this thesis, only people with limited contract are considered 
outsiders and are coded in the outsider category. People with no contract are excluded in the analysis. It is 
important to have in mind that this thesis only test this part of the insider-outsider divide. However, the exact same 
regressions where also ran where people with no contract where coded in the outsider category, and the overall 
result are the same as when they are excluded.   
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protection is in a country. EPL is put in place to protect workers from unfair dismissal. In this 
thesis, two measures of EPL are used, EPL for regular contracts and EPL for temporary 
contracts. EPL for regular contracts protects people from individual and collective dismissals. 
EPL for temporary contracts refers to the rules affecting standard fixed-term contracts and 
temporary-work-agency employment (OECD 2004). The two indicators for regular and 
temporary workers cannot be directly compared to each other, it only serves as cross-country 
comparisons of the strictness of the respective contract type (Marx & Picot 2014). Table 2 
present the labour market indicators for the 19 countries included in this study. 
 
Table 2. Country level determinants: labour market characteristics  
Country 
  
ALMPs (% of 
GDP) 
PLMPs (% of 
GDP) 
EPL for regular 
contracts (0-6) 
EPL for 
temporary 
contracts (0-6) 
Austria 0,55 1,25 2,44 2,17 
Belgium 0,53 2,05 2,99 2,42 
Switzerland 0,49 0,74 2,1 1,38 
Czech Republic 0,14 0,23 2,66 2,13 
Denmark 1,36 1,74 2,27 1,79 
Estonia 0,13 0,85 2,07 2,29 
Finland 0,83 1,71 2,17 1,88 
France 0,66 1,36 2,165 1,96 
Great Britain 0,05 0,33 1,68 0,48 
Greece 0,14 0,46 2,85 3,17 
Hungary 0,7 0,34 2,07 2 
Italy 0,34 1,56 3,03 2,71 
Lithuania 0,18 0,29 2,42 3,21 
Netherlands 0,68 1,36 2,88 1,17 
Norway 0,41 0,34 2,31 3,04 
Poland 0,59 0,34 2,39 2,33 
Sweden 1,07 0,68 2,52 1,17 
Slovenia 0,39 0,66 2,7 2,5 
Slovakia 0,15 0,66 2,63 2,17 
Note: Version 3 for the EPL indices are used. The EPL indices exist in three version each. Version 1 and 2 does not incorporate 
all the data items of version 3. Therefore, version 3 should always be used if it is available. 
Source: OECD statistics and Eurostat 
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Higher level of spending on ALMPs and PLMPs, and a stricter EPL, are expected to 
influence people’s feelings of security, and in a second step their probability to vote for anti-
immigrant parties. People in more protected countries are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant 
parties because they feel more secure. The indicators of ALMPs, PLMPs and EPL are well-
established measurements in the labour market literature when investigating the role of labour 
market institutions and policies (see e.g. Chung and van Oorschot 2011; Chung and Mau 2014; 
Berglund and Wallinder 2015).   
Control variables at individual and contextual level 
At the individual level, the model includes the control variables gender, age (four categories), 
domicile and educational level. These socio-demographic characteristics have in previous 
research been identified as important for understanding who votes for anti-immigrant parties12. 
Male voters tend to be overrepresented among the electorate of anti-immigrant parties (Givens 
2004). There are also differences between age groups; young people are more susceptible to 
the appeal of anti-immigrant parties (Arzheimer 2009), although there is some evidence that 
the age differences are diminishing or even reversed (Demker 2014; Sannerstedt 2016). Highly 
educated are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to people with low 
education (Kitschelt 2007). Educational level is defined by the international standard 
classification of education (ISCED). People on the countryside are more inclined to vote for 
anti-immigrant parties compared to people living in cities (Demker 2014). The control variables 
also affect the focal independent variable: temporary employed are more often young people 
(OECD 2016). People with low education are more often temporary employed compared to 
people with higher education. However, there are no large gender differences in temporary 
employment, and thus only affects the dependent variable as described above (Eurostat 2016).  
A variable that captures cultural factors of anti-immigrant feelings will be included as a 
rival independent variable. Previous research is inconclusive whether people oppose 
immigration due to economic or cultural reasons, and some argue that cultural factors matter 
more than economic factors. The variable measuring cultural determinants is based on the 
question in ESS where respondents have to position themselves on the following statement: 
“Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants”. This is a measure of cultural 
factors that has been used in previous research multiple times before when testing rival 
hypothesis between economic and cultural factors (see e.g. Oesch 2008; Halikiopoulou & 
                                                     
12 For details on exact coding procedure for all variables see appendix 1. 
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Vlandas 2015). In all models a control variable for ESS round is included as well as country 
fixed effects to eliminate country heterogeneities.  
Three control variables at the contextual level will also be included to account for potential 
country level confounders. These are unemployment rate, total immigration and real GDP 
growth and are the most important context control variables identified in previous research. 
Unemployment rate as percentage of total is included because it captures the largest problem 
in the labour market and receives a lot of attention from the public. When unemployment is 
high, it could lead to exclusionist’s reactions from the in-group (Coffe´ et al. 2007). However, 
the empirical test of how level of unemployment affect voting on anti-immigrant parties have 
showed varying results, some find an insignificant relationship (Lubbers et al. 2002, Swank & 
Betz 2003), others a negative relationship (Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Jackman & Volpert 
(1996) show a positive and significant relationship between level of unemployment and voting 
for anti-immigrant parties. Whether total immigration to a country have an impact on support 
for anti-immigrant parties is still an open question, some find support that more immigration 
increases the support for anti-immigrant parties, whereas others do not find such a relationship 
(Rydgren 2008). Real GDP growth is included to control for the overall economic progress in 
a country. The reason for including Real GDP is that it is expected that people in worse 
economic times are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties. One reason behind this 
assumption is that competition between people increase when resources are scarce (Coffe et al. 
2007). 
The years chosen for the control variables at the context level follows the same logic as the 
indicators for labour market policies and institutions: data is taken from the year prior the 
election in each country. 
Statistical method 
Since voting for an anti-immigrant party, which is the dependent variable, is dichotomous 
taking on the values 0 or 1, logistic regression is an appropriate method. However, the data 
have a hierarchical structure including variables measured at different levels. The first level 
includes individuals and the second level includes country-level variables such as labour market 
policies and institutions. This is because national variation is assumed to have consequences on 
individual inhabitants: people in more protected countries are assumed to be less likely to vote 
for anti-immigrant parties. If data is nested, the independence assumption is violated. But by 
using multilevel-modelling the problem of dependency between observations can be solved 
(Hox 2002). Multilevel models allow that both intercepts and slopes vary across contexts, which 
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is beneficial if the interest is in cross-country differences (Field 2009). The advantage with 
multilevel models is that it allows researchers to understand whether lower level variables 
change as a function of higher-order moderating variables. Such cross-level interaction is used 
when investigating the conditioning role of labour market policies and institutions as expressed 
in H3. This thesis expects that lower level relationships depend on higher-level factors (Aguinis 
et al. 2013).   
The analysis is structured as follows: several multilevel logistic regressions are conducted, 
and the result for respective labour market policy or institution will be presented in four tables. 
The results will be presented in several steps. First, an empty model will include only the 
dependent variable. Here the intra-class correlation (ICC) coefficient is interesting since it 
shows how much variation in the dependent variable that is at the country level. Second, an 
analysis is done only including the individual level variables and country fixed effects, in order 
to test hypothesis 1, if people with limited contract are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant 
parties. Third, the bivariate relationship between respective indicator for the labour market 
policy or institution will be added in order to test hypothesis 2a and 2b, how spending on labour 
market polices or the strictness of EPL affect voting for anti-immigrant parties. Then, all 
individual level and context controls will be included in one model. Degrees of freedom relate 
to the number of observations that are free to vary in a model (Field 2009). In order to save 
degrees of freedom due to a relative small number of countries, the numbers of context controls 
are reduced compared to what is presented above. Only context controls which are significant 
are included in the final analyses, meaning that unemployment rate is excluded in the analysis 
when investigating the role of ALMPs, and all context controls are excluded in the analysis of 
PLMPs. Unemployment rate and total immigration is excluded in the analyses of EPL13. All 
models discussed so far allows for a random intercept but fixed slope. The second last model 
includes all variables but allows for a random slope effect for type of contract. The random 
slope model allows the explanatory variable, type of contract, to have a different effect for each 
country. In the last model a cross-level interaction between respective labour market policy or 
institution and type of contract is included to test hypothesis 3. Inclusion of the random slope 
effect of type contract means that moving from unlimited to limited contract means different 
things in different countries. If the results are robust for these specifications and the coefficient 
for the random slope decreases between the two last models, less unexplained variance is left 
                                                     
13 The same regressions where ran with all context controls and the exclusion of the context controls does not have 
an impact on the overall results. 
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in the model meaning that the indicator for labour market policy or institution explains a part 
of the variation (the standard deviation decrease).   
 
Results  
In this section the results of the empirical analysis will be presented. The analysis starts with a 
null specification model. Model 0 in table 3 include only the dependent variable, voting for 
anti-immigrant party14. In model 0 the ICC coefficient is most interesting. The ICC value, 
0,208, can be translated into 20,8 percent, meaning that 20,8 percent of the variability in the 
dependent variable is at the country level. This means that multilevel logistic regression is an 
appropriate tool to account for the nested data. 
 Furthermore, in model 1 the focal independent variable, type of contract, is included 
together with all individual level control variables in order to test hypothesis 1. There is no 
significant association between type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties, the 
expected positive relationship is not found.  Hypothesis 1 is thus not supported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14The tables in the result section just show the coefficients for the variables of main interest, namely type of 
contract, respective indicator for labour market policy or institution and the interactions. See appendix 3 for full 
tables where all coefficients for the control variables are presented. Concerning the individual level controls, they 
mainly follow the expected pattern. Predicted probabilities for the significant individual level controls was 
calculated, holding all other variables constant. Females are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared 
to men. The predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party is 7,1 percent among males compared to 5,1 
percent among females. People with tertiary education are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared 
to people with less than lower secondary education. The predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party 
for people with the highest education is 3,2 percent, whereas it is 7,5 percent for people with the lowest educational 
level. Older people are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to the youngest. The predicted 
probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party is 4,3 percent for an individual who is 65 years or older compared 
to 6,5 percent for an individual who is between 15-29 years old. People living on the countryside are more likely 
to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to people living in bigger cities. The predicted probability to vote for 
an anti-immigrant party among people living in a big city is 5,3 percent, compared to 7,2 percent among people 
living in a farm or on the country side.  People who agree on the statement that immigration undermine cultural 
life are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties. The predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party 
is 1,8 percent for an individual who have the lowest value on the culture variable (i.e who think cultural life is 
enriched by immigration) compared to 24,1 percent for an individual with the highest value on the culture variable 
(i.e who think cultural life is undermined by immigration). Cultural factors and educational level is thus the 
strongest individual level predictors for voting for anti-immigrant parties. The context controls show that an 
increase in the number of immigrants to a country, the higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. One 
unit increase in real GDP growth, the higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties.   
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Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of ALMPs on voting for anti-immigrant parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
 
 
In model 2 the variable for spending on ALMPs is included. There is a significant positive 
relationship between level of spending on ALMPs and probability to vote for anti-immigrant 
parties. Contrary to what expected in hypothesis 2a, the more countries spend on ALMPs the 
higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Model 3 includes all control variables at 
the individual and contextual level and the significant relationship between spending on 
ALMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties remains positive and significant. Model 4 is 
identical to previous model, but allows for a random slope of type of contract. The results are 
robust for these specifications. In model 5 a cross-level interaction between type of contract 
and ALMPs is done, in order to test hypothesis 3: if level of government spending on ALMPs 
affects people’s probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties differently between contract 
types. Model 5 show that there is no significant interaction effect. There is no significant 
difference between people with unlimited and limited contract. The trend is the same 
irrespective of type of contract. The relationship between ALMPs and voting for anti-immigrant 
parties remain positive and significant. In table 3 it can also be seen that the random slope 
coefficient for type of contract decreases between model 4 and 5, indicating that less 
unexplained variance is in the model after including ALMP, hence ALMPs explain a part of 
the variation. 
 
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
-.036   
(.092)  
-.036   
(.092) 
-.062   
(.118) 
-.419   
(.238) 
ALMPs 
 
 1.183*   
(.581) 
1.296**   
(.499) 
1.263*   
(.522) 
1.243*   
(.497) 
Type of 
contract*ALMPs  
 
   
.587   
(.320) 
Individual level controls  
 
No 
 
Yes  
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Country level controls No No  No Yes Yes Yes 
  
 
    
Fixed intercept  -2.512***   
(.217) 
-4.650***   
(.635) 
-3.097***   
(.351) 
-4.268***   
(.558) 
-4.234***   
(.575) 
-4.200***   
(.559) 
Random intercept .930  
(.160) 
.833  
(.143) 
.840   
(.145) 
.626   
(.109) 
.624  
(.110)   
.621  
(.109) 
Random slope (type of 
contract)  
 
  
.163   
(.200) 
.132   
(.212) 
ICC .208 
 
    
Log Likelihood  -4690.882 -4118.551 -4688.995 -4113.353 -4113.237 -4111.428 
Countries 19 19  19   19 19 19 
N 15,918 15,918 15,918 15,518 15,518 15,518 
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To visualise the result, figure 3 shows the predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant 
party under different levels of ALMP, for all contract types, while all other variables are held 
at their means. 
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities to vote for anti-immigrant party under different levels of 
ALMPs. 
 
Note: Adjusted Predictions with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the more a country spends on ALMPs, the higher probability to vote for 
anti-immigrant parties15.  
As a robustness check, the same regressions where ran with party identification as 
dependent variable16. These analyses confirm the results: the more a country spends on ALMPs, 
the higher probability to identify with an anti-immigrant party. The coefficient for ALMPs is 
significant, and goes in the same direction, the more spending on ALMPs, the higher probability 
                                                     
15 The reason why the confidence intervals are large on higher values on ALMPs is because there are fewer 
observations with higher values on ALMPs compared with lower values. 
16 All the tables for the regressions with party identification with anti-immigrant party as dependent variable can 
be found in appendix 4. 
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to identify with anti-immigrant parties. There is no significant interaction effect. So far, the 
robustness check confirms the results. 
 Table 4 present the results from the analyses between level of spending on PLMPs, type of 
contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties.  Model 1 shows the bivariate association 
between PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties. There is no statistically significant 
association between spending on PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties.  
 
 
Table 4. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of PLMPs on voting for anti-immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
 
Model 2 includes all control variables at the individual level and model 3 adds the random slope 
effect of type of contract. The association between PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties 
becomes positive but is not statistically significant. Model 4 includes the interaction between 
PLMPs and type of contract. The interaction is not statistically significant, meaning that there 
is no significant difference between people with unlimited and limited contract. Taken together, 
the results show that there is no significant association between level of spending on PLMPs 
and voting for anti-immigrant parties, or a statistically significant interaction effect. 
The same regressions where ran with party identification as dependent variable. The overall 
results for PLMPs are the same as with vote for anti-immigrant party as dependent variable, 
with just some minor differences. No support for hypothesis 2a is found, rather there is evidence 
pointing in the other direction than expected theoretically. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
-.037   
(.092) 
-.089   
(.125) 
-.197   
(.223) 
PLMPs 
-.060   
(.380)   
.130   
(.323) 
.0979   
(.322)   
.123   
(.320) 
Type of contract*PLMPs 
   
.111    
(.181) 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes  Yes 
Country level controls No No No No 
     
Fixed intercept  -2.458***   
(.402) 
-4.287*** 
(.651) 
-4.183***  
(.663) 
-4.189***   
(.653)   
Random intercept .929   
(.160) 
.758   
(.132) 
.750   
(.132) 
.749   
(.131) 
Random slope (type of 
contract )   
.195   
(.189)   
.208   
(.179)   
Log Likelihood  -4690.870 -4116.961  -4116.612    -4116.421 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 15,918 15,518 15,518 15,518 
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 Turning to the result of the EPL, table 5 present the results from the analysis of EPL for 
regular workers, type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Model 1 shows the 
bivariate association between EPL for regular workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties. 
Model 1 shows that there is no significant association between strictness of EPL for regular 
workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties.  
 
Table 5. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for regular workers on voting for anti-
immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
 
In model 2, type of contract and all relevant control variables at individual and contextual level 
are added. The coefficient for EPL is not statistically significant. Model 3 allows for a random 
slope effect and in model 4 the interaction between type of contract and EPL for regular workers 
is added. Taken together, there is no significant association between strictness of EPL for 
regular workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties. The interaction is not statistically 
significant. 
The same regressions where ran with party identification as dependent variable. In the 
robustness check, a significant negative association is found in a bivariate analysis between 
EPL for regular workers and identifying with anti-immigrant parties. The significant 
relationship disappears when control variables are added. Taken together, the results from the 
robustness check goes in the same direction and confirms the results.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
-.036   
(.092) 
-.100   
(.129) 
-.035   
(.842) 
EPL regular 
-1.037   
(.575) 
-.490  
(.596) 
-.538   
(.587) 
-.543   
(.593) 
Type of contract*EPL 
regular 
 
   
-.027   
(.343) 
 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Country level controls No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed intercept  .016    
(1.414)  
-2.859   
(1.771) 
-2.619   
(1.763) 
-2.607   
(1.776) 
Random intercept .856   
(.148) 
.744  
(.131) 
.734   
(.130) 
.734 
(.130) 
Random slope (type of 
contract )   
.212   
(.186) .210   (.189) 
Log Likelihood  -4689.378    -4116.712 -4116.259 -4116.256 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 15,918 15,518 15,518 15,518 
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Lastly, in table 6, the results from the analysis of EPL for temporary workers, type of 
contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties are presented. Model 1 tests the bivariate 
association between EPL for temporary workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties. There 
is no significant association between strictness of EPL for temporary workers and voting for 
anti-immigrant parties. 
 
 
Table 6. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for temporary workers on voting for anti-
immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
 
In model 2, type of contract and all relevant control variables at individual and contextual level 
are added. The coefficients for type of contract and EPL remain insignificant. Model 3 allows 
for a random slope effect and model 4 includes the interaction between EPL for temporary 
workers and type of contract. Taken together, the results show no significant association 
between strictness of EPL for temporary workers and the probability to vote for anti-immigrant 
parties. There is no statistically significant interaction effect.  
The same regressions where ran with party identification as dependent variable. In contrast 
to when voting for anti-immigrant party was used as dependent variable, the results are 
significant17. These analyses find the expected negative relationship: the stricter the EPL for 
                                                     
17The regression table and a plot presenting predicted probabilities are presented in appendix 4. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
.036   
(.092)   
-.081    
(.124) 
.214  
(.332) 
EPL temporary 
-.194   
(.311) 
-.447   
(.343) 
-.412   
(.346) 
-.431    
(.340) 
Type of contract*EPL 
temporary 
    
-.145   
(.157) 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Country level controls No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed intercept  -2.106**   
(.686) 
-2.799**   
(1.249) 
-2.843**  
(1.244) 
-2.778**    
(1.241) 
Random intercept .922    
(.158)     
.726   
(.128) 
.720  
(.127) 
.719   
(.127) 
Random slope (type of 
contract )   
.184   
(.192) 
.165   
(.206)   
Log Likelihood  -4590.689  -4116.230 -4115.984 -4115.565 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 15,918 15,518 15,518 15,518 
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temporary workers, the lower the probability to identify with an anti-immigrant party. A 
significant interaction effect is also found between type of contract and EPL for temporary 
workers. Since these results only are visible in the robustness check, no large conclusions 
should be drawn from them. Despite that the robustness check show a weak tendency towards 
that stricter EPL for temporary workers lower the probability to identify with anti-immigrant 
parties, hypothesis 2b is rejected. 
To sum up, the overall results are conclusive. There is no significant relationship between 
type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties. People with limited contracts are not 
more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to people with unlimited contracts. 
Hypothesis 1 is thus not supported. Contrary to what hypothesis 2a expects, the empirical 
analysis shows the higher level a country spend on ALMPs, the higher the probability to vote 
for anti-immigrant parties. There is no significant association between level of spending on 
PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Hypothesis 2a is not supported, rather, there is 
evidence pointing in the opposite direction. The empirical analysis do not presents evidence of 
an association between strictness of EPL and voting for anti-immigrant parties. There are no 
convincing evidence suggesting that the stricter EPL, the lower provability to vote for anti-
immigrant parties. Hypothesis 2b is thus not supported. No support is found for hypothesis 3, 
no moderating effect of labour market policies and institutions are found in the cross-level 
interactions between labour market policies or institutions and type of contract. Labour market 
policies or institutions do not moderate the impact of type of contract on voting for anti-
immigrant parties. There is no different effect of labour market policies or institutions between 
contract types18.  
 
Concluding discussion  
This thesis started out with the observation that the structure of the labour market in 
industrialized economies has changed during the last decades. There has been an increase in 
atypical employment, such as limited contracts and part time jobs. Some argue that this has 
implications for political behaviour and that the insider-outsider divide can constitute new 
groups for political mobilization. Alongside with the changes on the labour market have new 
types of parties’ emerged- anti-immigrant parties. New evidence suggests that labour market 
                                                     
18All regressions in this thesis were also run without the variable measuring cultural determinants of anti-
immigrant attitudes. Because there is a divide in previous research whether economic or cultural attitudes matter 
more. If the culture-variable is excluded, no differences in the overall results are found.  
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policies and institution can mitigate the success of anti-immigrant parties, because they 
compensate for the cost and risk of unemployment (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2015). This thesis 
aim was to investigate the relationship between the insider-outsider divide, voting for anti-
immigrant parties and the role of labour market policies and institutions. The proposed 
mechanism was that features of the welfare state, labour market policies and institutions, could 
reduce feeling of insecurity as a consequence of an insecure position on the labour market. 
More specifically, this thesis tested whether people with insecure employment contracts are 
less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties in countries with more generous labour market 
policies and institutions. The overall results point in the same direction: few associations 
between type of contract, labour market policies and institutions and voting for anti-immigrant 
parties is found. There is no support for hypothesis 1, that is, no significant association between 
type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Outsiders are not more prone to support 
anti-immigrant politics compared to insiders. Some evidence of an association between labour 
market policies and institutions and voting for anti-immigrant parties is found. Contrary to what 
was expected by hypothesis 2a, the higher level of spending on ALMPs in a country, the higher 
probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. There are no evidence suggesting that the stricter 
EPL, the lower provability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Hypothesis 2b is thus not 
supported. No interaction effect is found: type of contract, being an insider or outsider, does 
not affect voting for anti-immigrant parties differently depending on the design of labour market 
policies in a country. Hence, no support for hypothesis 3 is found in the analysis.  
This thesis have both empirical and theoretical contributions. Empirically, a first test of the 
insider-outsider divide and how it affects anti-immigrant party success has been performed. 
According to the empirical analysis the insider-outsider divide does not qualify as structuring 
political behaviour. The insider-outsider divide does not constitute new groups for political 
mobilization as suggested by Rueda (2005), at least not when it comes to anti-immigrant 
politics. Thus, the relevance of the insider-outsider divide in structuring people’s voting 
behaviour needs more thorough tests. Another empirical contribution is the test of the 
relationship between labour market policies and institutions and voting patterns for anti-
immigrant parties, which rarely have been done before. Theoretically, this thesis further 
elaborated on the institutional argument and on the new evidence put forward in a recent study 
by Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015). This thesis took the mechanism and tested it on the 
national context. Contrary to what Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) show, the empirical 
analysis show no ‘protective’ effect of labour market policies and institutions. The empirical 
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analysis partly shows that type of labour market policy or institution matter for voting 
preferences, but in a different direction than expected. Labour market policies and institutions 
seem to affect voting for anti-immigrant parties, but further theorizing and more empirical tests 
are needed to uncover the mechanisms and how different labour market policies and institutions 
matter for voting behaviour.  
Some points need to be mentioned concerning that the empirical results deviates from what 
was expected theoretically. 
First, one potential explanation could be that the argument put forward in this thesis is rooted 
in an economic argument. This thesis wanted to test the economic argument at the macro and 
micro level jointly, which rarely has been done. But as stated above, previous research is 
inconclusive whether economic or cultural factors matter more for anti-immigrant party 
success. The argument that economic insecurity based on an insecure labour market position 
should translate into support for anti-immigrant parties may not hold because cultural factors 
matter more than economic factors. The empirical analysis also confirmed that the variable 
measuring cultural factors was a strong predictor for explaining voting for anti-immigrant 
parties. 
Second, as suggested by Rueda (2005), the insider-outsider divide may lead to political 
radicalization and alienation and translate into political preferences. According to the empirical 
analysis of this thesis this does not hold, at least not for anti-immigrant parties. Other societal 
divides, such as class position, might still be stronger in explaining voting behaviour. Type of 
contract might also have different consequences for peoples feeling of security on the labour 
market depending on class position. For example, low skilled workers in a precarious positon 
might feel more insecure than high-skilled workers in temporary contracts.  
Third, the concept of welfare chauvinism needs to be mentioned. The theory of welfare 
chauvinism suggests that in-groups exclude out-groups because they fear losing what they have 
in terms of welfare benefits. The theory suggests that people in more comprehensive welfare 
states are more negative towards immigration to protect the welfare system (Faist 1994). 
Hypothetically, this could be a partial explanation to the found association: that increased levels 
of spending on ALMPs are positively related to voting for anti-immigrant parties. However, 
there seems to be mixed evidence for the welfare chauvinism theory: it has also been found that 
people in more encompassing welfare states are more positive towards out-groups (see e.g. 
Crepaz & Damron 2008). The relationship between the role of the welfare state institutions and 
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voting for anti-immigrant parties seems to be complex and needs more research to uncover the 
mechanisms at work.  
Fourth, one reason why the results of the empirical analysis differ from what was expected 
theoretically could be related to the availability of data. One problem that already has been 
mentioned is related to the survey data and that anti-immigrant parties generally are 
underestimated in surveys. If these parties consequently are underrepresented, it is harder to get 
significant results. It might also have helped if it was possible to expand the number of countries 
in the empirical analysis. 19 countries are on the low side when it comes to multilevel modelling 
but this thesis maximized and included as many countries as possible, but some countries are 
omitted due to missing context data. Expanding the number of countries might yield a different 
result.  
Lastly, there might be a time aspect that this thesis does not capture. Countries with higher 
level of spending on for example ALMPs might have had even higher level of spending in the 
past. People may experience relative deprivation because the level of social spending on labour 
market policies is lower than earlier. It might therefore be the change in level of social spending 
that matters rather than the current level. If the level of social spending in a country have moved 
from, for example, very high to fairly high, and the size of anti-immigrant parties at the same 
time varies the association can become contrary to what’s expected This is a problem when 
using cross-sectional data where you only get a snapshot of reality. Panel data at the individual 
level matched with macro level indicators would have been ultimate and is one way to further 
investigate the research questions. If comparative individual level panel data becomes 
available, one way to continue could be to focus on the change in level of social spending and 
change in strictness of employment protection instead of the actual level and see if it yields a 
different result. Since this thesis partly shows, and previous studies have shown, that labour 
market policies and institutions affect voting behaviour, and more specifically the success of 
anti-immigrant parties, it is important to advance the research in this area.  
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics, definitions and sources of variables 
 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev Min Max Description Sources 
Vote for anti-
immigrant party 
15,518 .096 .295 0 1 
The dependent variable 
is recoded so voting for 
anti-immigrant party is 
coded as 1, 0 otherwise. 
Only respondents who 
chose an alternative is 
included. Not 
applicable, refusal and 
don't know answers are 
excluded. 
ESS 
Employment 
contract 
15,518 .126 .332 0 1 
The independent 
variable, employment 
contract, is measured 
using the question 
"Do/did you have a 
work contract of 
unlimited or limited 
duration?” The variable 
is recoded where 0 
means unlimited and 1 
limited. No contract, 
Not applicable, refusal, 
don't know and NA are 
excluded. 
ESS 
Age 15,518 2.715 .966 1 4 
Age is recoded into 4 
age groups; (1) 14-29, 
(2) 30-49, (3) 50-64 and 
(4) 65+. Missings are 
excluded. 
ESS 
Gender 15,518 .541 .498 0 1 
Gender is recoded to 0 
men, 1 women. 
Missings are excluded. 
ESS 
Education 15,518 3.490 1.187 1 5 
Educational level is 
defined by the 
international standard 
classification of 
education (ISCED) and 
recoded into 5 groups. 
(1) less than lower 
secondary, (2) lower 
secondary, (3) upper 
secondary, (4) post 
secondary and (5) 
tertiarty education. 
Missings are excluded. 
ESS 
Domicile 15,518 2.856 1.207 1 5 
Domicile Is based on 
the question "Which 
phrase on this card best 
describes the area 
where you live?" (1) A 
big city, (2) the suburbs 
or outskirts of a big 
city,  (3) a town or a 
small city, (4) a country 
village or (5) a farm or 
home in the 
countryside. Refusal, 
don't know and no 
answer are excluded. 
ESS 
Immigration bad 
for culture 
15,518 4.336 2.476 0 10 
Respondents have to 
position themselves on 
ESS 
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the following 
statement: “Country's 
cultural life 
undermined or enriched 
by immigrants”. They 
choose a number 
between 0 (Cultural life 
undermined) and 10 
(Cultural life enriched). 
The order of this 
variable is reversed, 
meaning that in this 
analysis a higher value 
on the scale indicate 
more negativity. 
PLMPs 15,518 .935 .588 0,23 2,05 
Spending on passive 
labour market policies,  
% of GDP in Euros. 
Eurostat 
ALMPs 15,518 .532 .360 0,05 1,36 
Spending on active 
labour market policies, 
% of GDP in Euros. 
Eurostat 
EPL regular 15,518 2.418 .344 1,68 3,03 
Strictness of 
employment protection 
– individual and 
collective dismissals 
(regular contracts), 
version 3. 
OECD 
EPL temporary 15,518 2.017 .697 0,48 3,21 
Strictness of 
employment 
protection- temporary 
contracts, version 3. 
OECD 
Unemployment 
rate 
15,518 8.541 3.379 3,2 16,7 
Unemployment rates 
represent unemployed 
persons as a percentage 
of the labour force. The 
labour force is the total 
number of people 
employed and 
unemployed. 
Unemployed persons 
comprise persons aged 
15 to 74. 
Eurostat 
 
Real GDP growth 15,518 .988 2.662 -5,5 6 
Real GDP growth rate – 
volume. Percentage 
change on previous 
year. 
Eurostat, 
OECD 
 
Total immigration 15,518 90.196 104.123 1,199 430 
Yearly inflow of 
foreign population to 
country (1000s). 
Internatio
nal 
migration 
database, 
OECD 
statistics 
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Appendix 2: Sources of coding of anti-immigrant parties 
 
Country Anti-immigrant party Source  
Austria 
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), 
Alliance for the Future of Austria 
(BZÖ) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Belgium 
Flemish interest (VB), National 
Front (FN) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Switzerland 
Swiss peoples party (SVP) , Ticino 
league (LEGA) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Czech Republic Usvit 
Parties and elections in Europe (2013). Retrieved 
2016-08-09, from http://www.parties-and-
elections.eu/czechia.html. 
Denmark Danish peoples party (DF) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Estonia 
Estonian Conservative Peoples 
Party (EKRE), Estonian 
independence party (EIP) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15.; Det slutna Europa (Expo and Svenska 
Dagbladet). Retrieved 2019-08-09, from 
http://detslutnaeuropa.se/eesti-konservatiivne-
rahvaerakond-ekre/. 
Finland True Finns (PS) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
France National Front (FN) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Great Britain Ukip 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Greece Golden Dawn (GD), LAOS 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15.; Vasilopoulou, S., & Halikiopoulou, D. 
(2015). The Golden Dawn's ‘Nationalist Solution': 
Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece. 
Springer. 
Hungary Jobbik 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Italy Northern League (LN) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Lithuania Party Order and Justice (TT) 
Rydgren, J. (Ed.). (2012). Class politics and the 
radical right. Routledge. 
Netherlands Party for the Freedom (PVV) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Norway Progress party (FrP) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
44 
  
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Poland Law and Order (PiS) 
Pankowski, R., (2010) The Populist Radical Right in 
Poland: The Patriots, Oxon: Routledge; Harrison, S. 
and Bruter, M. (2011). Mapping Extreme Right 
Ideology: An Empirical Geography of the European 
Extreme Right, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; 
Pankowski, R and Kormak, M., (2013) ‘Radical 
Nationalism in Poland: From Theory to Practice’ In R. 
Melzer & Serafin, S. (Eds.), Right-wing extremism in 
Europe: Counter-strategies and Labor-Market 
Oriented Exit Strategies. Friedrich Ebert Foundation. 
Sweden Sweden Democrats (SD) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Slovenia Slovene National party (SNS) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
Slovakia Slovak National party (SNS) 
Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical 
right: Distances between the European radical right 
and other parties on typical radical right issues, Party 
Politics, 1-15. 
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Appendix 3: Full tables of multilevel logistic regressions  
Table 7. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of ALMPs on voting for anti-immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)  
 
-.036   
(.092) 
 
-.036   
(.092) 
-.062   
(.118) 
-.419   
(.238) 
ALMPs   
1.183*   
(.581) 
1.296**   
(.499) 
1.263*   
(.522) 
1.243*   
(.497) 
Type of contract*ALMPs      
.587   
(.320) 
Individual level controls  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Gender (0 male, 1 female)  
-.352*** 
(.059) 
 
-.351***   
(.059) 
-.351***   
(.059) 
-.352*** 
(.059) 
Age (ref: 14-29)       
30-49  
.158   
(.105) 
 
.160   
(.105) 
.160   
(.105) 
.166   
(.105) 
50-64  
-.113   
(.108) 
 
-.110   
(.108) 
-.110   
(.108) 
-.103   
(.108) 
65+  
-.430***    
(.115) 
 
-.426***   
(.115) 
-.424***   
(.115) 
-.418***   
(.115) 
Education (ref: less than 
lower secondary) 
      
Lower secondary  
.201    
(.139) 
 
.210   
(.139) 
.212   
(.140)  
.208    
(.140) 
Upper secondary  
.007   
(.129) 
 
  .016   
(.129) 
.018   
(.130) 
.014   
(.130) 
Post secondary  
-.174   
(.144)   
 
  -.168   
(.144) 
-.166   
(.144) 
  -.168   
(.144) 
Tertiary    
-.891***   
(.148) 
 
-.884***    
(.148) 
-.882***   
(.148) 
-.886***   
(.148) 
Domicile (ref: Big city)       
Suburbs or outskirts of big 
city 
 
.163   
(.115) 
 
.159   
(.115) 
.158   
(.115) 
.162   
(.115) 
Town or small city    
.072   
(.089) 
 
.075   
(.089) 
..075   
(.089) 
.078   
(.089) 
Country village  
.179*   
(.090)   
 
.182* 
(.090)   
.182*   
(.090) 
.186*   
(.090) 
Farm or home in 
countryside 
 
.321*   
(.134) 
 
.319*   
(.134) 
.317*   
(.134) 
.324*   
(.134) 
       
Immigration bad for culture 
(0 cultural life enriched, 10 
cultural life undermined) 
 
.284***   
(.013) 
 
.285***   
(.013) 
.284***   
(.013) 
.285***    
(.013) 
Country level controls No No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Real GDP    
.241*   
(.091) 
.242*   
(.091) 
.242* 
(.091) 
Unemployment rate       
Immigration    
.004*   
(.002) 
.004*   
(.002) 
.004*   
(.002)    
       
Fixed intercept  -2.512***   
(.217) 
-4.650***   
(.635) 
-3.097***   
(.351) 
-4.268***   
(.558) 
-4.234***   
(.575) 
-4.200***   
(.559) 
Random intercept .930  
(.160) 
.833  
 (.143) 
.840   
(.145) 
.626   
(.109) 
.624 
 (.110)   
.621  
 (.109) 
Random slope (type of 
contract) 
    
.163   
(.200) 
.132   
(.212) 
ICC .208      
Log Likelihood  -4690.882 -4118.551 -4688.995 -4113.353 -4113.237 -4111.428 
Countries 19 19  19   19 19 19 
N 15,918 15,918 15,918 15,518 15,518 15,518 
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Table 8. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of PLMPs on voting for anti-immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)  
 
-.037   
(.092) 
-.089   
(.125) 
-.197   
(.223) 
PLMPs 
-.060    
(.380)   
.130   
(.323) 
.0979   
(.322)   
.123   
(.320) 
Type of contract*PLMPs  
  
.111    
(.181) 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Gender (0 male, 1 female)  
-.352***   
(.059) 
-.352***   
(.059) 
-.353*** 
(.059) 
Age (ref: 14-29)     
30-49  
.158 
(.105) 
.160   
(.105) 
.162  (.105) 
50-64  
-.113 
(.108) 
-.112   
(.108) 
-.109   
(.108) 
65+  
-.430***   
(.115) 
-.427***   
(.115) 
-.425***   
(.115) 
Education (ref: less than 
lower secondary) 
    
Lower secondary  
.200 
(.139) 
.203   
(.140)  
.202    
(.140) 
Upper secondary  
.005 
(.129) 
.007   
(.130) 
.006   
(.130) 
Post secondary  
-.177 
(.144) 
-.173   
(.144) 
  -.173   
(.144) 
Tertiary    
-.893***    
(.148) 
-.892***   
(.148) 
-.893***   
(.148) 
Domicile (ref: Big city)     
Suburbs or outskirts of big 
city 
 
.167 
(.115) 
.166   
(.115) 
.167   
(.115) 
Town or small city    
.075   
(.089) 
..076   
(.089) 
.076   
(.089) 
Country village  
.182* 
(.090)   
.182*   
(.090) 
.182*   
(.090) 
Farm or home in 
countryside 
 
.323*   
(.134) 
.322*   
(.134) 
.323*   
(.134) 
     
Immigration bad for culture 
(0 cultural life enriched, 10 
cultural life undermined) 
 
.284***   
(.013) 
.284***   
(.013) 
.284***    
(.013) 
Country level controls No No No No 
Real GDP     
Unemployment rate     
Immigration      
     
Fixed intercept  -2.458***   
(.402) 
-4.287*** 
(.651) 
-4.183***  
(.663) 
-4.189***   
(.653)   
Random intercept .929   
(.160) 
.758   
(.132) 
.750   
(.132) 
.749   
(.131) 
Random slope (type of 
contract)   
.195   
(.189)   
.208   
(.179)   
Log Likelihood  -4690.870 -4116.961  -4116.612    -4116.421 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 15,918 15,518 15,518 15,518 
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Table 9. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for regular workers on voting for anti-
immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
-.036   
(.092) 
-.100   
(.129) 
-.035   
(.842) 
EPL regular 
-1.037   
(.575) 
-.490  
(.596) 
-.538   
(.587) 
-.543   
(.593) 
Type of contract*EPL 
regular    
-.027   
(.343) 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Gender (0 male, 1 female)  
-.353***   
(.059) 
-.353***   
(.059) 
-.353*** 
(.059) 
Age (ref: 14-29)     
30-49  
.158 
(.105) 
.160   
(.105) 
.160  (.105) 
50-64  
-.114 
(.108) 
-.111   
(.108) 
-.112   
(.108) 
65+  
-.431***   
(.115) 
-.427***   
(.115) 
-.427***   
(.115) 
Education (ref: less than 
lower secondary) 
    
Lower secondary  
.202 
(.139) 
.205   
(.140)  
.205    
(.140) 
Upper secondary  
.005 
(.129) 
.007   
(.130) 
.008   
(.130) 
Post secondary  
-.177 
(.144) 
-.172   
(.144) 
  -.172   
(.144) 
Tertiary    
-.893***    
(.148) 
-.891***   
(.148) 
-.891***   
(.148) 
Domicile (ref: Big city)     
Suburbs or outskirts of big 
city 
 
.167 
(.115) 
.166   
(.115) 
.165   
(.115) 
Town or small city    
.075   
(.089) 
..076   
(.089) 
.076   
(.089) 
Country village  
.184* 
(.090)   
.183*   
(.090) 
.184*   
(.090) 
Farm or home in 
countryside 
 
.324*   
(.134) 
.323*   
(.134) 
.323*  
(.134) 
     
Immigration bad for culture 
(0 cultural life enriched, 10 
cultural life undermined) 
 
.284***   
(.013) 
.284***   
(.013) 
.284***    
(.013) 
Country level controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Real GDP  
.154   
(.081) 
.155*   
(.078) 
.155*  
(.078) 
Unemployment rate     
Immigration      
     
Fixed intercept  .016    
(1.414)  
-2.859   
(1.771) 
-2.619   
(1.763) 
-2.607   
(1.776) 
Random intercept .856   
(.148) .744  (.131) 
.734   
(.130) 
.734 
(.130) 
Random slope (type of 
contract)   
.212   
(.186) 
.210   
(.189) 
Log Likelihood  -4689.378    -4116.712 -4116.259 -4116.256 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 15,918 15,518 15,518 15,518 
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Table 10. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for temporary workers on voting for anti-
immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
.036   
(.092)   
-.081    
(.124) 
.214  
(.332) 
EPL temporary 
-.194   
(.311) 
-.447   
(.343) 
-.412   
(.346) 
-.431    
(.340) 
Type of contract*EPL 
temporary    
-.145   
(.157) 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Gender (0 male, 1 female)  
-.353***   
(.059) 
-.353***   
(.059) 
-.353*** 
(.059) 
Age (ref: 14-29)     
30-49  
.158 
(.105) 
.160   
(.105) 
.159  (.105) 
50-64  
-.114 
(.108) 
-.112   
(.108) 
-.113   
(.108) 
65+  
-.431***   
(.115) 
-.428***   
(.115) 
-.430***   
(.115) 
Education (ref: less than 
lower secondary) 
    
Lower secondary  
.202 
(.139) 
.204   
(.140)  
.204    
(.140) 
Upper secondary  
.006 
(.129) 
.009   
(.130) 
.006   
(.130) 
Post secondary  
-.176 
(.144) 
-.172   
(.144) 
  -.175   
(.144) 
Tertiary    
-.892***    
(.148) 
-.890***   
(.148) 
-.893***   
(.148) 
Domicile (ref: Big city)     
Suburbs or outskirts of big 
city 
 
.165 
(.115) 
.165   
(.115) 
.166  (.115) 
Town or small city    
.075   
(.089) 
..075   
(.089) 
.077   
(.089) 
Country village  
.182* 
(.090)   
.183*   
(.090) 
.182*   
(.090) 
Farm or home in 
countryside 
 
.324*   
(.134) 
.323*   
(.134) 
.324*   
(.134) 
     
Immigration bad for culture 
(0 cultural life enriched, 10 
cultural life undermined) 
 
.285***   
(.013) 
.284***   
(.013) 
.284***    
(.013) 
Country level controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Real GDP  
.227*   
(.099) 
.220*   
(.098) 
.220*  
(.097) 
Unemployment rate     
Immigration      
     
Fixed intercept  -2.106**   
(.686) 
-2.799**   
(1.249) 
-2.843**  
(1.244) 
-2.778**    
(1.241) 
Random intercept .922    
(.158)     
.726   
(.128) .720  (.127) 
.719   
(.127) 
Random slope (type of 
contract)   
.184   
(.192) 
.165   
(.206)   
Log Likelihood  -4590.689  -4116.230 -4115.984 -4115.565 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 15,918 15,518 15,518 15,518 
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Appendix 4: Robustness checks 
 
Table 11. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of ALMPs on identifying with anti-immigrant 
parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable party identification with anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
 
Table 12. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of PLMPs on identifying with anti-immigrant 
parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable party identification with anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
       
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
-.052   
(.098)  
-.051   
(.098) 
-.069   
(.141) 
-.244   
(.287) 
ALMPs 
  
1.357   
(.704) 
1.631**   
(.609) 
1.714** 
(.607) 
1.590*   
(.626) 
Type of 
contract*ALMPs      
.285   
(.399) 
Individual level controls  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Country level controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed intercept  -2.427*** 
(.263) 
-5.171***   
(.772) 
-3.097***   
(.427) 
-4.767***   
(.679) 
-4.971***   
(.725) 
-4.878***   
(.724) 
Random intercept 1.120   
(.198) 
1.020  
(.175)   
1.018    
(.181) 
.769  
 (.136) 
.799   
(.144) 
.794   
(.143) 
Random slope (type of 
contract)     
.345   
(.136) 
.347   
(.137) 
ICC .276      
Log Likelihood  -3932.158 -3246.563 -3930.449 -3241.637 -3238.981 -3238.719 
Countries 19 19 19   19 19 19 
N 12,079 11,812 12,079 11,812 11,812 11,812 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
-.052   
(.098) 
-.088   
(.154) 
-.204   
(.277) 
PLMPs 
-.218   
(.460) 
-.003   
(.418) 
.001  
(.419) 
-.031    
(.425) 
Type of contract*PLMPs 
   
.123  
(.240) 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Country level controls No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed intercept  -2.233***   
(.484) 
-4.754***    
(.828) 
-4.819***   
(.915) 
-4.776***   
(.901) 
Random intercept 1.116  
(.197) 
.975  
(.168) 
.987    
(.172) 
.986  
(171) 
Random slope (type of 
contract )   
.358   
(.141) 
.364   
(.141) 
Log Likelihood  -3932.045 -3245.674 -3243.278 -3243.143 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 12,079 11,812 11,812 11,812 
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Table 13. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for regular workers on identifying with 
anti-immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable party identification with anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
 
 
Table 14. Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for temporary workers on identifying 
with anti-immigrant parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable party identification with anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party). 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
-.051    
(.098) 
-.122   
(.158) 
-.601   
(.994) 
EPL regular 
-1.740**  
(.655) 
-1.152   
(.737) 
-1.246   
(.783) 
-1.235   
(.754) 
Type of contract*EPL 
regular    
.206    
(.418) 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Country level controls No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed intercept  1.809    
(1.601) 
-1.541   
(2.190) 
-1.144   
(2.452) 
-1.189   
(2.345) 
Random intercept .955   
(.168) 
.915   
(.158)  
.915   
(.159) 
.916   
(.159) 
Random slope (type of 
contract )   
.380   
(.153) 
.373   
(.153)  
Log Likelihood  -3929.033 -3244.520 -3242.092 -3241.972 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 12,079 11,812 11,812 11,812 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Type of contract (0 
unlimited, 1 limited)   
-.052   
(.098) 
-.048   
(.138) 
.607  
(.345) 
EPL temporary 
-.553   
(.358) 
-1.078**   
(.395) 
-1.181**   
(.384) 
-.975*   
(.405) 
Type of contract*EPL 
temporary    
-.356*  
(.180) 
Individual level controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Country level controls No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed intercept  -1.268   
(.789) 
-1.309   
(1.439) 
-1.285    
(1.400) 
-1.641    
(1.483) 
Random intercept 1.057   
(.187) 
.820   
(.142) 
.866   
(.157) 
.845  
(.148) 
Random slope (type of 
contract )   
.330  
(.132)    
.258    
(.137) 
Log Likelihood  -3931.018 -3242.492 -3239.484 -3237.628 
Countries 19   19 19 19 
N 12,079 11,812 11,812 11,812 
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities to identify with anti-immigrant party, under different levels 
of EPL for temporary workers, among people with unlimited and limited contract. 
 
 
Note: Adjusted predictions with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
